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The very idea of democracy at work 
 
Richard Hyman 
London School of Economics 
Summary 
The employer-employee relationship involves the right to command on the one hand, 
the duty to obey on the other. Is democracy at work possible? This article explores 
some of the contrasting understandings of industrial democracy over time and across 
countries, discusses how the historical advance of rights and citizenship at work has 
been reversed under neoliberalism, and ends by considering how labour movements 
might fight to regain the achievements of previous decades. 
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Introduction 
In theory, the employment relationship is an exchange between equals: the 
employee performs work, the employer pays a wage or salary. The labour market, 
wrote Marx (1867/1976: 280), is ‘a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the 
exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because 
both buyer and seller of a commodity, let us say of labour-power, are determined 
only by their own free will. They contract as free persons, who are equal before the 
law.... Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple 
owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, 
because each disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks 
only to his own advantage.’  
 Of course his meaning was deeply ironical, as he went on to demonstrate. 
The property of a typical worker and that of a large (and today, perhaps multinational) 
company are incommensurable. Accordingly, the freedom of the one inhabits a totally 
different universe from the freedom of the other. More fundamentally, the dynamic of 
capitalism requires the employer to extract a surplus from the worker’s labour; and 
this entails a whole apparatus of coercion and control which transforms work itself 
into a sphere of inequality and unfreedom. In some countries, indeed, the law 
explicitly prescribes the right of the employer to dictate and the obligation of the 
employee to obey. 
 The authoritarian foundations of capitalist wage-labour have long been 
challenged on the left, but have also been regarded sceptically by progressive 
liberals. For example, in his Principles of Political Economy, John Stuart Mill 
(1848/1909) commented that ‘all privileged and powerful classes, as such, have used 
their power in the interest of their own selfishness’ and anticipated a reaction by 
workers who were benefitting from education and gaining rights in the political 
sphere. ‘I cannot think that they will be permanently contented with the condition of 
labouring for wages as their ultimate state.’ 
 But is democracy at work possible, and how should it be understood? Not all 
on the left have accepted the very idea. Notoriously Engels, in an effusion of 
technological determinism, wrote in 1872 that ‘the automatic machinery of the big 
factory is much more despotic than the small capitalists who employ workers ever 
have been’. The price of the material benefits of advanced technology was the 
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acceptance of quasi-military discipline. The socialist objective was to capture the 
ownership of the means of production, not to democratize their application. 
 In the 20th century, emerging labour movements embraced very different 
views of the possibility of democracy at work, both within and – even more – between 
countries. Even more diverse have been the understandings of what democratization 
might mean, how democracy at work might relate to other dimensions of the struggle 
for democracy and how it might be achieved. This is not the place to review the 
multiplicity of ideas of democracy within the left, but it is fascinating how these 
diverse understandings have their echoes in the other contributions to this collection. 
Is the idea of industrial democracy framed in terms of rights or of status? Is the 
central focus the workplace, or the broader economic and social context in which it is 
embedded? Is the goal to achieve employee participation in management decisions, 
to impose controls over management policies, or to create systems of self-
management? And if the aim, as industrial democracy is often presented, is to 
achieve citizenship at work, how is citizenship itself understood? Below I turn briefly 
to this complex issue. 
 
The ambiguities of citizenship 
When Sidney and Beatrice Webb wrote their classic analysis of the structure and 
functions of trade unionism, they chose the title Industrial Democracy to emphasize 
their view that unions were ‘a necessary element in the democratic state’ (Webb and 
Webb, 1897: 825). Echoing Mill half a century earlier, they insisted that political 
democracy was incompatible with ‘unrestrained capitalist enterprise’: indeed for the 
worker, the autocratic dominance of the employer ‘meant a far more genuine loss of 
liberty, and a far keener sense of personal subjection, than the official jurisdiction of 
the magistrate, or the far-off, impalpable rule of the king’. Hence they drew ‘the 
imperative lesson that political democracy will inevitably result in industrial 
democracy’ (1897: 841–842). 
 Half a century later, in his lectures on Citizenship and Social Class, Marshall 
(1950) explored the evolution of institutions linking rights, status and responsibilities 
in modern (and more specifically, British) society. He saw the key achievement of the 
previous two centuries as the rise, at national level, of universal citizenship. This 
process, he argued, occurred in three stages. The first, largely accomplished in the 
18th and early 19th centuries, involved the institutionalization of the civil basis of 
citizenship: ‘the rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, 
freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid 
contracts, and the right to justice’. The second, roughly a hundred years later, saw 
the extension of political citizenship through electoral reform: the struggle for the 
franchise resulted in ‘the right to participate in the exercise of political power’. The 
third, a project of the 20th century, was the creation of ‘social citizenship’: the right to 
at least minimum standards of ‘economic welfare and security’ and hence to enjoy 
‘the life of a civilised being’ (1950: 10–11). Although (unlike the Webbs) he was not 
primarily concerned with trade unions, he did note that their success in establishing 
their right to exist, to bargain, and if necessary to take industrial action, transformed 
the geography of social relations, creating ‘a secondary system of industrial 
citizenship, parallel with and supplementary to the system of political citizenship’ 
(1950: 42–44). 
 Following Marshall, the concept of citizenship (as other contributions to this 
issue indicate) is commonly interlinked with that of democracy at work, not least in 
Germany. Kotthoff (1994) gave his study of works councils the title ‘Works Councils 
and Citizenship: Change and Continuity in Workplace Codetermination’. Similarly, 
Müller-Jentsch (2008) collected a series of essays under the title ‘Work and 
Citizenship: Studies of Social and Industrial Democracy’. As he argued (2008: 13), 
there was a dynamic interaction between the separate spheres of ‘the system of 
production on the one hand and civil society on the other’. 
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 His own analysis – referring directly to the passage from Marx’s Capital with 
which I began – suggested that this dialectic was as much contradictory as 
complementary. Even though the modern workplace might require workers willing 
and able to use their independent judgment and initiative, ‘this does not mean that 
the factory gates will be opened wide to new industrial citizenship rights’ (2008: 35). 
Such rights, one might infer, would not be voluntarily conceded by employers but 
rather necessitated a struggle against them. Yet the discourse of citizenship is often 
used to imply a more consensual evolution of progress and enlightenment. 
Particularly noteworthy in this context is the ambiguity of the German language (the 
etymology of which requires more analysis than space permits): the term bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft means both civil society and bourgeois society. Where other languages 
embody a clear conceptual distinction (bourgeois/citoyen, borghese/cittadino ...), 
German conflates the two. Hence the tension between concepts denoting class 
division under capitalism on the one hand, and shared rights within the broader 
society on the other, is suppressed by the German language itself. 
 Yet this tension is inherent in the historical evolution of citizenship rights, and 
in particular in efforts to win democracy at work, as I discuss below. 
 
The long struggle for democratization  
How did we arrive here? Following (and amplifying) Marshall, we may view 
democratization as a four-stage process. The first involved the conquest of political 
(liberal) democracy: the universal right to vote, and the freedom to organize 
electorally and to oppose the incumbent government. In western Europe at least, the 
battle for political democracy has been largely won, often at great cost. Though many 
on the left have at times been sceptical of this achievement – ‘if voting changed 
anything, they would make it illegal’ – the experience of fascism and military 
dictatorship has taught even critics that liberal democracy is necessary, even if 
insufficient. 
 The second stage stemmed from the demand that citizenship should not be 
confined to the right to vote every four or five years, but should have a broader social 
dimension. Social democracy emphasized the collective character of social and 
political life, and the mutual responsibility of individual and collective. The pursuit of 
rights to collective representation through trade unions and collective bargaining, and 
for the construction of a ‘welfare capitalism’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990) providing 
education, health care, pensions and income support in time of need, was the 
outcome of a vision of social justice but also reflected awareness that starvation was 
not a reliable foundation for intelligent democratic participation. ‘Erst kommt das 
fressen, dann kommt die Moral,’ wrote Brecht: a full belly comes before moralizing.  
 Third came the insistence that it was impossible to be a free citizen in the 
public sphere but a slave in the workplace. Democracy could not end outside the 
factory gates: workers were stakeholders in the firm that employed them and must 
have industrial citizenship rights. Hence the third stage was the demand for industrial 
democracy: employees should possess an effective voice within enterprise decision-
making in order to shape the organization of their own work and, not least, to control 
the ability of the employer to hire and fire. 
 The fourth stage addressed the broader theme of economic democracy. 
Workers’ representation within workplace decision-making was a necessary element 
in democratization; but decisions affecting day-to-day work arrangements were 
largely conditioned by prior policies regarding investment, product strategy and 
marketing. They were also shaped by the broader macroeconomic context within 
which the individual enterprise was located; democracy within one factory was 
impossible. The most developed analysis of the case for economic democracy, and 
of a strategy to achieve this goal, can be found in the ideas developed by Fritz 
Naphtali (1928) for the German trade unions almost a century ago. His analysis later 
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proved very influential in the German and Austrian trade union movements in the 
early post-war years.  
 The ‘post-war compromise’ between labour and capital, which assumed 
different forms across western Europe after 1945, involved uneven advances in all 
four aspects of democratization. Political democracy was restored in nations that had 
been subject to fascist dictatorship, even though in some this was not achieved until 
the 1970s, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe remained one-party 
states until after 1989. In some cases, women gained equal electoral rights only after 
1945. 
 Post-war settlements brought considerable advances in the democratization 
of the social sphere. Keynesian demand management resulted in near-full 
employment in many – though certainly not all – west European countries. Welfare 
states were universally expanded, or newly created, though their character differed 
markedly across countries: some were genuinely egalitarian, others represented a 
form of ‘socialism within one class’ in which those in employment in effect used their 
own collective income to insure against the risks of unemployment, ill health and old 
age, receiving benefits which matched the original inequality of their incomes. New 
industrial relations institutions, sometimes graced with the label ‘social partnership’, 
were widely established; trade union membership expanded, and in many countries 
collective agreements covered the majority of the workforce for the first time. 
 Progress in the third area, democratization of the workplace, was far more 
uneven. Systems of collective representation through works councils were 
institutionalized in much of Europe, but in many countries their rights did not extend 
beyond information and consultation rather than enabling real joint decision-making 
(Mitbestimmung or co-determination). In others, as in France, their main functions 
covered the organization of social facilities rather than the regulation of production. 
Even the strongest systems – with Germany the exemplary case – had primary 
jurisdiction over employment issues arising only after key decisions on investment 
and product strategy had already been taken. As Briefs (a key trade union figure in 
works council research) noted in 1989, the more strategic the issue for management, 
the weaker the powers of the councils. Sceptics in some countries – Britain is an 
obvious example – argued that there was a major risk that employee representatives 
would share the blame for management decisions that they could not fundamentally 
influence. Or as the slogan of May 1968 put it, je participe, tu participes ..., ils 
profitent. 
 Developments in the broader sphere of economic democracy were 
particularly uneven and ambiguous. In France, Italy and Britain, extensive 
programmes of public ownership were implemented; but though nationalization 
provided a favourable environment for trade union activity, its bureaucratic character 
did little to enhance democratic control. Most social democrats soon abandoned, 
explicitly or implicitly, the idea of comprehensive public ownership – most notably in 
the Godesberger Programm of the German SPD in 1959. In Germany, another key 
issue was of course the demand for parity representation on supervisory boards. The 
terms of the 1952 legislation which established board-level employee representation 
were a clear defeat for the trade unions – even if later claimed as a victory (Müller-
Jentsch 2008) – and even the stronger 1976 law did not bring genuine parity; though 
certainly even a minority presence can help strengthen workers’ voice in corporate 
decision-making. In most other countries where board-level representation was 
enacted, only a symbolic presence was provided.  
 For Naphtali, socialization of the economy was an essential goal, but it should 
be achieved, not necessarily and not exclusively through state ownership but through 
more diverse forms of popular control. In the main, his wide-ranging ideas for 
measures of democratization between state and company levels were forgotten. One 
interesting by-product was the strategy developed in the 1970s by Rudolf Meidner 
(who was born in Germany but took Swedish nationality after fleeing the Nazis) for 
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the Swedish LO, involving payment of a share of company profits to wage-earner 
funds (Löntagarfonder) (Meidner, 1978; Olsen, 1992). The essence of the policy was 
to establish collective employee ownership of part of the profits of corporate success, 
in the form of shares held in a fund under trade union control. This, it was envisaged, 
could provide increasing control over strategic decisions in the dominant private 
companies. Strenuous opposition from employers, lack of support from other unions 
and the ambivalence of the governing social democrats meant that the initiative was 
defeated and disappeared from the political agenda. 
 
The juggernaut of capital 
Writing in the depths of war, Karl Polanyi (1944) interpreted the development of 
capitalist economies as the outcome of a ‘double movement’. The first, in the 19th 
century, involved the imposition of ‘free’ markets (though the whole idea of free 
markets is an oxymoron, since all markets are social and political constructs). The 
damaging social effects of this process, in particular those transforming labour into a 
‘fictitious commodity’ to be hired and fired at will, provoked a counter-movement. 
Hence the struggles in the 20th century for social, industrial and economic 
democracy, summarized above, represented a countervailing process to impose 
some constraint on the disruptive social consequences of market liberalism. Markets 
became ‘embedded’ in a systematic regulatory web.  
 Polanyi anticipated a parallel reaction to the excesses of market-making at 
the international level: renewed state regulation of the domestic economy linked to a 
retreat from ‘capitalist internationalism’. What however emerged, wrote Ruggie four 
decades later, was a new form of international regime, involving a bounded 
liberalization of external trade, but linked to Keynesian economic management and a 
partial decommodification of labour at national level. ‘The principles of multilateralism 
and tariff reductions were affirmed, but so were safeguards, exemptions, exceptions, 
and restrictions – all designed to protect the balance of payments and a variety of 
domestic social policies’ (1982: 381). As Ruggie later summarized it (2003: 93–94), 
‘embedded liberalism’ involved a social compromise, ‘a grand social bargain’, which 
combined ‘the efficiency of markets with the values of social community’. 
 We can now see that this post-war social compromise was inherently 
ambiguous and unstable. In the German context, this ambiguity underlay the very 
idea of a social market economy (soziale Marktwirtschaft). As propagated by the 
ruling post-war christian democrats, the emphasis was on the market, not on the 
social: the underlying ordo-liberal economic model involved a rejection not only of 
social democracy but also of the social wing of christian democracy. Only very 
belatedly has this model been embraced across the political spectrum as inherently 
progressive, as Müller-Jentsch  (2011) shows in the case of the trade unions.  
 The compromise was unstable for three main reasons. First, it reflected a 
specific, historically contingent balance of class forces. Second, it assumed different 
forms cross-nationally, but in all cases involved an accommodation between national 
labour movements, employers who were primarily national in terms of corporate 
ownership and production strategies, and governments which were to a large degree 
autonomous in social and economic policy: an outcome of the bounded character of 
economic internationalization which Ruggie described. Third, the existence of an 
alternative socio-economic model to the east – however deformed and repressive – 
imposed a degree of self-restraint on capitalist aggression. 
 These three preconditions no longer apply. What has developed in recent 
decades has been analysed by McMurtry (1998) as the ‘cancer stage of capitalism’. 
Polyani (1944: 73) described labour, land and money as ‘fictitious commodities’ 
because while they were all subject to market forces, unlike real commodities they 
were not produced for sale on the market. ‘To allow the market mechanism to be the 
sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even 
of the amount and use of their purchasing power, would result in the demolition of 
 6 
society.’ And indeed, the post-war compromises imposed firm limits on the 
commodification of labour, land and money; but Polanyi’s analysis was remarkably 
prescient. The process which McMurtry describes is the systematic weakening and 
removal of the social constraints on the destructive dynamic of commodification: a 
‘carcinogenic mutation’ which has released the pathological potential which capitalist 
economies always contained. 
 The cancer stage of capitalism is linked as both cause and effect to the 
erosion of the three preconditions of post-war social compromises. Globalization – of 
which European economic integration is one important element – has removed the 
dominant capitalist agglomerations from national control, and has provided an alibi 
for anti-social policies by governments that insist that there is no alternative to 
submission to global markets (Weiss, 1998). Liberalization of financial markets has 
spawned an array of exotic fictitious commodities which Polanyi could never have 
imagined: derivatives, secondary markets, hedge funds, private equity, leveraged 
buy-outs ... National economies and national labour markets are increasingly 
disembedded from effective social regulation; and the beneficiaries of financialized 
‘shareholder value’ capitalism have little interest in maintaining historic compromises. 
The balance of class forces has shifted radically. 
 These trends can be understood, within Polanyi’s framework, as a counter-
counter-movement, a third phase involving the deliberate unravelling of the 
regulatory web constructed in previous decades. The cancer stage of capitalism is 
objectively, and for many of its drivers deliberately, reactionary. In particular, it rolls 
back all four dimensions of democratization. 
 Formally, the institutions of political democracy are intact; indeed their 
geographical scope has significantly extended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
But form and substance do not always coincide, as Putin’s Russia clearly 
demonstrates. The cancer stage of capitalism mutates the inner workings of the 
polity. As Crouch has argued, electoral politics has been drained of the capacity to 
provide popular influence over the most significant dimensions of social life and has 
become in large measure a stage-managed ritual. ‘Behind this spectacle of the 
electoral game, politics is really shaped in private by interaction between elected 
governments and elites that overwhelmingly represent business interests’ (2004: 4). 
It is also evident that globalized financial capitalism is one of the principal 
grave-diggers of social democracy. Keynesian macroeconomic management, one of 
the key foundations of the post-war settlement, presupposed the economic 
governance capacity of the nation state; macroeconomic demand management has 
now been subordinated to the assumed inevitability of national ‘competitiveness’. 
Where significant productive and infrastructural assets were in public hands, in most 
countries these have now been largely privatized. Trade union membership, as a 
proportion of the labour force, is almost universally in decline: a trend which Peters 
(2011) shows can be attributed to the impact of the global financialization of 
capitalism.  
 In much of western Europe, collective bargaining coverage remains stable – 
though this is not true of Germany, and even less so of Britain and most of eastern 
Europe – but its content has been hollowed out through diverse forms of concession 
bargaining. For two or three decades, the wage share in national income has 
declined and inequality has increased. Even before the current crisis, government 
budgets had been squeezed, to an important extent through a competitive reduction 
in corporation tax in an attempt to avoid capital flight: in consequence, the welfare 
state has been cut back, transformed increasingly into a minimal safety net. Even this 
diminished level of social protection is under threat as part of the current austerity 
drive, given an explicitly coercive character by the neoliberal rulers of the European 
Union and codified through such measures as the Euro Plus Pact, the Fiscal 
Compact and the ‘Six-Pack’. Indeed in the current conjuncture the Troika, totally 
unelected and unaccountable, is able to push through labour market deregulation, 
 7 
bargaining decentralization and cuts in public sector pay regardless of the democratic 
will in the countries affected (Meardi, 2014). Greece represents the extreme case 
(Demertzis and Faniel, 2015; Varoufakis, 2015). 
 The cancer stage of capitalism likewise undermines the elements of industrial 
and economic democracy achieved in earlier decades. Co-determination in one 
company was always precarious; now, the toxic combination of financialization, 
globalization and neoliberalism means that primarily enterprise- or establishment-
based mechanisms of co-determination are forced to accommodate to the externally 
imposed requirements of intensified global competition. ‘The institutions [of employee 
representation] have not only lost their decommodifying impact on labour, they 
themselves are gradually commodified’ (Holst, 2014: 5) as the threat of capital exit 
can make it imperative to underwrite managerial priorities. Moreover, strategic 
decision-making is increasingly removed from the sphere of co-determination; more 
seriously still, the very identity of the employer more and more becomes shifting and 
obscure as companies themselves become treated primarily as commodities to be 
bought and sold in the interests of share-price maximization. Accordingly, ‘employers 
can’t keep their side of the bargain’ (Thompson, 2003). Here too, the EU governing 
institutions are helping drive this process – as, for example, in the effort to overturn 
the ‘Volkswagen law’ that provided some protection against predatory capital 
(Speidel, 2012).  
 Several writers have concluded that although formally intact, the machinery of 
co-determination no longer provides an effective mechanism for asserting and 
defending workers’ interests. We seem to have entered a phase of post-industrial 
democracy (Streeck, 2009; Urban, 2011). ‘Today, Mitbestimmung has become a 
governing principle for enterprise modernization, using limited employee 
participation, information and cooperation to win competitive advantage’ (Schumann 
and Detje, 2011: 79). 
 
Can democracy at work be reinvented? 
Since the impact of the crisis in 2008, there has been widespread discussion of the 
deficiencies in existing systems of corporate governance, particularly as the 
liberalization of global financial transactions has made ‘shareholder value’ the 
overriding corporate goal even in ‘coordinated’ market economies. With the shock of 
crisis, some union policy-makers have come to recognize that the overriding 
challenge is to build a movement for greater democratization of the economy and to 
create new links between different levels of regulation and different issues on the 
regulatory agenda. But what centre-left trade unionists have often condemned is – in 
the words of the former ETUC general secretary (Monks, 2006) – the ‘new, 
overmighty capitalism’ of hedge funds, asset-stripping, financial speculation and 
astronomical bonuses. The solution, from this perspective, is to fight to restore the 
old capitalism: the trade union movement should ‘become a champion of good 
business practices, of decent relations with decent employers while ruthlessly fighting 
the speculators’. In short, the task is to campaign for a return to ‘good capitalism’ 
(Dullien et al., 2009). 
 Can the genie be forced back into the bottle? Can democracy at work and 
financialized monopoly capitalism coexist? If the central dynamic of 21st century 
capitalism involves vast concentrations of unaccountable private economic power, 
the answer is surely no. I agree with Schumann and Detje (2011: 73): ‘at a time when 
systemic responses to existential systemic challenges are called for, the social 
market economy is a reactionary answer’. The solution cannot simply be a 
technocratic regulatory fix, for the cancer stage of capitalism is linked to a 
fundamental shift in the relative capacities of capital and labour. Under post-
democracy, immense economic resources are easily translated into corresponding 
political resources, providing a virtual veto on effective regulation; and where new 
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regulations are imposed, the rich and powerful possess a battery of weapons to 
escape their effect (Streeck, 2011). 
 The challenge facing those favouring democracy at work, and in particular 
trade unions, is immense. Unions are essentially national organizations, which now 
have to confront the might of multinational capital. Despite the formal existence of 
international trade union structures, unions apply their own principle of ‘subsidiarity’ 
and are reluctant to delegate authority and resources to their supranational 
representatives. The EU, once regarded by most trade union movements as a force 
for social progress, is now dominated by neoliberal fanatics and is driving the 
demolition of democratic social institutions at national level. Finance capital operates 
in a time-space continuum that is totally divorced from the terrain on which trade 
unions engage. How can a fourth Polanyian movement be created? As RH Tawney 
(1932: 336), a perceptive English socialist, said almost a century ago, ‘onions can be 
eaten leaf by leaf, but you cannot skin a live tiger paw by paw’. Of course a simple 
anti-capitalist response is not on the current political agenda. Yet to capture hearts 
and minds, the labour movement has to commence a campaign against global 
casino capitalism that is linked to a credible set of alternatives for socially 
accountable economic life. For the present, what is needed, in Gramsci’s terms, is a 
‘war of position’, in order to re-shape the terrain of debate and understanding. 
 While the material forces ranged against a re-democratization of economy 
and society are immense, the ideological obstacles are no less significant. 
Neoliberalism has emerged from the crisis – which surely demonstrated the practical 
bankruptcy of its recipes – stronger than ever (Crouch, 2011), partly because it 
serves powerful vested interests, but also because of the lack of widespread 
conviction, even among its opponents, that there is an alternative which is both 
practical and inspirational. There is a wall in our heads: neoliberalism has become 
the ‘common sense’ of our times, positing the inevitability of commodification, 
competitiveness, private affluence (for some) and public squalor (Galbraith, 1952). 
 A radically different logic is required, of sustainability, solidarity, equity and 
dignity. Yet too often, we argue on the enemy’s ground. For example, trade unionists 
often defend mechanisms of employee ‘voice’ as a source of comparative 
institutional advantage that contributes to competitiveness – rather than insisting that 
democratic self-determination at work is in itself a requirement of human dignity. 
Likewise, a developed welfare state is often defended primarily as a ‘productive 
factor’ rather than as an essential component of a solidaristic society. More 
fundamentally still, commodity fetishism corrupts all of us. To live better, the default 
option is to consume more: we are all programmed to be consumers. The free 
movement of commodities (rendered as ‘goods’ in the English version of the 
Treaties, but Waren in German and marchandises in French) is the foundation of 
European integration. From Marx and Keynes alike we draw the lesson that 
underconsumption is the source of capitalist crisis: to combat unemployment, we 
must stimulate demand. Thus is sustainability compatible with capitalism? 
 In any struggle for renewed democratization of work and of the economy, we 
have to start from where we are and not from where we would like to be. The ideas of 
‘free’ markets and a consumer society are unquestioned by all but a small minority. 
But beliefs and understandings are always complex and contradictory. In concrete 
terms, most people do question the current economic system. They are perplexed by 
a financial system which seems out of control. They are angry that failed bankers can 
still pay themselves obscene bonuses, that the rich still get richer while the rest of us 
suffer from the cuts, that extremely profitable corporations can exploit tax loopholes 
and tax havens to avoid paying their share. They are bewildered that hostile 
takeovers that destroy jobs are not only permitted but are actually encouraged by the 
European authorities. There is an upswell of popular anger and despair with which 
trade unions have scarcely begun to connect, though other actors – ATTAC, Occupy 
or the Uncut movement – have managed to engage effectively. 
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 Those of us who seek a renewed movement for democratization must start 
from this substratum of incomprehension and disconnect. Of course re-reading 
Naphtali is not enough: we must develop demands for the 21st century that are both 
understandable and credible. The issue is one of ‘framing’ the current situation and 
possible alternatives: showing how immediate experiences fit within the broader 
picture (Kelly, 1998). In communication, the key issue is often less what is said than 
what is heard. Everyone possesses a world-view, however inchoate, a set of beliefs 
and assumptions which make sense of a complex social environment and act as 
selective filters for what is communicated. So, at a time when the banking sector has 
been rescued by a vast transfer of public funds, democratization of ownership should 
be a logical corollary; let us make the argument! Pension funds are, in effect, 
workers’ deferred wages; but they have been key actors in the speculative spiral that 
produced the crisis. Bring them under democratic control! The trade union movement 
has embraced the demand for a financial transactions tax, but has barely discussed 
the question of its implementation. Why not use the revenue, not simply to plug the 
hole in national budgets, but to create investment funds under popular control? The 
neoliberals preach the need for brutal austerity measures to bring down public debt; 
let us demand citizens’ debt audits to establish which debts are genuine, who is 
responsible, and thus who should pay the costs!  
 Much more generally, the economic elites prosper through constructing a web 
of secrecy to cloak their activities. Knowledge is power, but concealment may mean 
even greater power. Let us demand democratic transparency so as to subject 
financialized capitalism to public scrutiny! As Block (2014) insists, we need ‘real 
utopias’ directed at the democratization of finance. The task is to develop demands 
which expose the rottenness at the heart of the cancer stage of capitalism, and at the 
same time suggest the possibility of an alternative. Whether or not we call this 
economic democracy, this is the underlying implication. 
 But democracy at work and in the economy must be a multi-level process and 
so must also be built from below. What are the possibilities for democratization in the 
space between state and market? The labour movement has a long tradition of 
cooperative production and distribution, though in many countries such cooperatives 
mutated long ago into simple commercial ventures. But smaller-scale, cooperative 
economic activity has often been able to provide some counter-power to the 
commodification of social life, particularly in the global South. Do such movements 
offer lessons for trade unions in the developed economies? While the idea of a 
‘social and solidarity economy’ is sometimes used primarily to encompass producer 
and consumer cooperatives (ILO, 2010), the newer understanding of économie 
solidaire or economia solidária points to a more specifically political strategy to resist 
neoliberal globalization (Draperi, 2007; Laville, 2007). Neamtan (2002: 7) defines 
such initiatives as ‘an integral part of the movement for an alternative globalization’, 
with production for use rather than profit under democratic, participative control. As 
an example, Buglione and Schlüter (2010: 25–27) describe the Libera Terra 
movement in Sicily, through which land confiscated from the Mafia is used 
collectively to create employment, build community cohesion and develop organic 
products. More generally, this can be seen as an example of a process where those 
who have lost their jobs seek to reclaim an identity as workers rather than as welfare 
recipients, as Boffo et al. (2014) describe in the case of Naples. An imaginative 
response to the cancer stage of capitalism and its crisis ought to draw on such ideas. 
 
What about the unions? 
To defend employees at workplace level and no less within the national (and 
international) political economy requires a confrontation with the dominant policy 
logic of our age. This implies that unions must turn (or return) to a self-conception as 
organizations campaigning for rights and engaging in ‘contentious politics’ (Tarrow, 
1998): contesting oppression, inequality and discrimination. It also implies 
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cooperation, often uneasy, with other social movements that in most countries have 
never acquired the respectability gained by trade unions. Potentially it redefines 
unions as outsiders in a terrain where until recently the role of insiders was 
comforting and rewarding. 
 The key issues here involve ideas, language and mobilization. The decline of 
union organization across Europe in recent years is in part ideological in causation: 
European unions were able to thrive when the prevailing policy discourse made 
collective regulation, employment protection and state welfare provision the 
commonsense of the times. The ideological counter-revolution of the past three 
decades – which has proceeded further and faster in some countries than in others – 
has placed trade unions very much on the defensive. They are often seen as 
representing a vested interest: those who are already relatively secure in the labour 
market, and have relatively good wages and working conditions; those who are in 
most cases winners or at least not major losers in the process of economic 
restructuring. But unions have to convince themselves and others that they are a 
‘sword of justice’ (Flanders 1970), representing the losers as well as the winners and 
seeking to convert the losers into winners. This requires a battle of ideas. 
 The battle of ideas is also a battle of words. Human actors ‘discern situations 
with particular vocabularies, and it is in terms of the same delimited vocabulary that 
they anticipate consequences of conduct. Stable vocabularies of motive link 
anticipated consequences and specific actions’ (Mills, 1940: 906). Yet the 
vocabularies of motive that legitimated traditional trade union action have an archaic 
ring today. Trade unions require effective linguistic means of ‘framing’ workers’ 
perceptions of the circumstances that afflict them, of attributing blame for their 
problems and of proposing credible remedies. If for example workers accept that 
deteriorating conditions of work, or threats of workplace closure, are the inevitable 
outcome of uncontrollable economic forces, collective resistance is futile. If they 
blame employers or governments for their predicament but have no conception of 
alternative policies, they may protest but are unlikely to prevail. If they conceive an 
alternative that they cannot communicate, it will be ineffectual.  
 Tilly (2006) has made an analogous point, that socio-political movements 
draw on ‘repertoires of contention’: forms of action that have been developed in the 
past and provide ‘scripts’ for the future, but which nevertheless are subject to 
constant innovation. Such repertoires, he suggests, contain three key elements: 
‘identity’, the assertion that those involved are a group with distinctive interests and 
the capacity to pursue these vigorously; ‘standing’, the insistence that their claims 
and interests deserve to be taken as seriously as those of other more powerful socio-
economic groups; and ‘programme’, an integrated set of demands. All three in his 
view are mutually supporting. Indeed this is a useful prism through which to regard 
European trade unions: in their period of greatest strength they could credibly claim 
to represent a constituency with a strong collective identity, to possess the standing 
of a recognized actor in societal policy-making, and to articulate a programme which 
reflected the general interest. In more recent times, in most countries, all three claims 
have been weakened, and the elements in this weakening have been mutually 
reinforcing. New vocabularies which give meaning to the identity, standing and 
programme of trade unionism are part of the key to union survival and renewal and 
the fight for democracy at work. 
 The idea of economic democratization offers a vision of popular 
empowerment which could reinvigorate trade unionism as a social movement and 
help launch a struggle for a genuinely alternative economy. One in which, at the 
same time, unions themselves would be more likely to thrive. Indeed the new general 
secretary of the TUC, Frances O’Grady, called (2013a) for ‘new models of corporate 
governance that empower all stakeholders, not just shareholders’, and pointed 
(2013b: 87–88) to large popular support for worker representation on company 
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boards and to the mobilizing potential of demands for employee voice on company 
remuneration committees. 
 However, there should be no illusions that this will be an easy task. Those 
who wield economic (and thus also political) power will fight tooth and nail to defend 
their privileges. Unions cannot win such a struggle on their own: as suggested above, 
it requires participation in alliances with other progressive movements with different 
beliefs, objectives and modes of action. Inevitably, this will often prove difficult. In 
referring to the possible integration of a diversity of progressive movements, Urban 
(2009) has written of ‘the mosaic left’; I might use the term ‘kaleidoscope left’, since 
the necessary alliances will be shifting and the underlying patterns will contrast. 
 To change the world, unions must change themselves. Unions cannot 
credibly campaign for the democratization of the economy unless they themselves 
are patently democratic. Indeed all unions have their time-honoured procedures of 
election and decision-making; but rarely do these engage more than a tiny minority of 
enthusiasts. Yet as one writer has insisted, ‘the power to fight stems from 
communication, or withers away’ (Arlt, 1994). There is no Michelsian ‘iron law of 
oligarchy’; but if union democracy is to be a reality, not mere formality, it is essential 
to foster the widest possible internal dialogue and debate. By struggling to strengthen 
and renew their own democratic processes and culture, unions can provide a model 
and win a legitimacy for a wider campaign for social and economic democracy. 
 In conclusion: the struggle for the democratization of work and of the 
economy requires a new, imaginative – indeed utopian – counter-offensive: a 
persuasive vision of a different and better society and economy, a convincing 
alternative to the mantra of greed, commodification, competitiveness and austerity, a 
set of values which connects with everyday experience at the workplace. Whether 
this is described as ‘good capitalism’, post-capitalism or socialism is of secondary 
importance. The urgent need is to regain an inspiring vision of unions as a ‘sword of 
justice’, which many trade union movements seem to have lost. In other words, 
unions have to articulate a more humane, more solidaristic and more plausible 
alternative if they are to vanquish neoliberalism, finding new ways to express their 
traditional core principles and values and to appeal to a modern generation for whom 
old slogans have little meaning. And since defending the weak is inescapably a 
question of power, unions have to help construct a new type of politics – in particular, 
by engaging with campaigning and protest movements that attract the Facebook and 
Twitter generation in ways which most trade unions have failed to do (even if many 
have recently begun to make serious efforts in this direction). Do unions dare to 
abandon old rules and routines in order to create new strategies? What is required is 
nothing less than a multinational liberation struggle! 
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